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The links between environmental degradation, renewable resource scarcity and conflict are still 
poorly understood. One reason for this is the positivist-rationalist bias which is characteristic of 
the mainstream literature on socio-environment conflicts but has largely remained unaddressed 
so far. Many studies are therefore unable to utilize insights from environmental sociology, 
constructivist conflict research and political ecology. Drawing on this literature and discourse 
theory, the article develops a constructivist understanding of socio-environmental conflicts 
(CUSEC). The proposed framework highlights the relevance of discursively constructed 
identities, situation assessments and interests for understanding the dynamics of such conflicts. 
The plausibility of the framework across different contexts is demonstrated by a discussion of the 
Israeli-Palestinian water conflict and forest conflicts in northern Thailand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At least since the late 1990s, the detection of possible links between environmental degradation, 
renewable natural resource scarcity and various forms of conflict ranks high on the agendas of 
political geography and peace and conflict research.1 Since 2007, these links have become a major 
point of contention in the debate on climate change and conflict.2 While such conflicts are often 
termed environmental or, more recently, climate conflicts, I prefer the term ‘socio-environmental 
conflicts’3, since it is both social and environmental factors that drive their dynamics. Despite 
much attention by policy makers and the large number of studies on the issue, the links between 
renewable resource scarcity/degradation and conflicts as well as the dynamics of such socio-
environmental conflicts are still poorly understood.4 
The lack of consensual findings in the research on socio-environmental conflicts has been 
attributed to a number of factors, including missing interaction between quantitative and 
qualitative scholars5, theoretical models which are underspecified6 or too complex to be tested by 
empirical research7, an inconsistent use of major variables8 and the lack of high-resolution data 
on many indicators9. While all these issues certainly deserve further attention, I suggest another, 
so far often ignored reason for our currently insufficient understanding of socio-environmental 
conflicts: Many studies on the links between environmental degradation, renewable natural 
resource scarcity and conflict are characterized by a positivist-rationalist bias. This bias manifests 
itself in three interrelated assumptions shared explicitly or implicitly by what one might call 
‘mainstream’ in the research on socio-environmental conflicts10: 
Firstly, most of these mainstream studies assume that there is a material world which exists 
independent of human cognition and whose material qualities are key drivers of human behavior. 
For instance, all large-N investigations on the link between precipitation changes and conflict use 
rainfall data measured by meteorological stations in order to operationalize their independent 
variable.11 By doing so, they implicitly assume either that rainfall reality is objectively measured by 
meteorological instruments and that human perceptions of it do not matter, or that 
meteorological instruments and local people perceive rainfall dynamics in the same objective way. 
Similarly, the classical qualitative case studies of Homer-Dixon and colleagues often use satellite- 
or expert-generated data to assess the degree of environmental degradation.12 But various studies 
have concluded that perceptions of environmental problems, changes and risks are not only 
relevant for social actions, but also highly dependent on political, cultural, historical and personal 
backgrounds. Perceptions of environmental factors and dynamics are therefore far from objective 
and have important implications for political actions.13 And even if there is agreement on the 
existence and magnitude of an environmental problem, its meaning, causes and solutions are 
usually disputed.14 
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Secondly, factors which can more obviously not be conceived as objective are hardly 
incorporated in the theoretical frameworks or empirical investigations of mainstream approaches, 
especially if quantitative methods are used.15 Recent works in conflict studies have emphasized 
the importance of concepts such as identities, narratives, threat perceptions or enemy images for 
the development of conflicts16. Anthropologic accounts have elaborated the symbolic dimensions 
of natural resource conflicts for quite some time.17 And various studies have already shown the 
benefits of concepts like social constructions or narratives when analyzing socio-environmental 
conflicts in Ethiopia18 and the Middle East19. However, such factors have, with the exception of 
some short references to ethnicity and past violence, so far hardly been considered in mainstream 
research on socio-environmental conflicts. This is true for large-N studies which have serious 
problems to quantify such variables. But also many theoretical frameworks20 and case studies21 
largely ignore the importance of such assumed ‘soft’ factors. 
Thirdly, the actions of individuals and social groups are not only assumed to be primarily 
structured by an objective, material reality. Humans are also conceived as acting in an 
instrumentally rationalist way towards this reality. Similar to the rational choice models in classical 
economics, social action is thus largely described as a result of informed means-end 
considerations. Among many other examples, just consider Salehyan’s explanation for why 
resource scarcity is unlikely to raise the risk of violent conflict onset: 
‘violent conflict is an inefficient and sub-optimal reaction to changes in the environment and 
resource scarcities […] Engaging in armed rebellion is quite costly and risky and requires 
large-scale collective action. Individuals and households are more likely to engage in simpler, 
personal, or smallscale coping strategies […] As mentioned above, rebellion does not 
distribute resources by itself, and protracted civil wars can have devastating effects on the 
economy and the natural environment, leaving fewer resources to bargain over.’22  
In other words, rational calculations about the resources they need, efficient strategies for 
acquiring them and the environmental impact of civil conflicts are considered to be the most 
important explanatory factors for the use of violence by individuals or social groups. This is not 
to say that such rational choice-based arguments are necessarily wrong (although they frequently 
are), but rather that they cannot account for some important aspects of social reality.23 
Instrumental rationalist accounts to conflict face problems, for instance, when they have to 
explain the use of violence in cases where/when violence is a suboptimal strategy in terms of 
utility maximization.24 
In short, there exists a positivist-rationalist bias in the mainstream research on socio-
environmental conflicts because many studies conceptualize individuals and social groups as 
utility maximizers which act in an instrumental rationalist manner towards a bio-physical and 
socio-economic surrounding which is reduced to its material, seemingly objective characteristics. 
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Such an understanding has well-known limitations, or rather blind spots. The aim of this article is 
to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing the inter-subjective dimensions 
of conflicts around scarce renewable resources. In order to do so, it combines insights from 
discourse theory, constructivist conflict research, political ecology and environmental sociology. 
The utility of this framework is demonstrated by discussing the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict 
and forest conflicts in northern Thailand. In doing so, this article adds to a growing, but still 
small number of studies which use constructivist insights to analyze socio-environmental 
conflicts.25 
The article proceeds as follows: At first, a theoretical framework for a constructivist 
understanding of socio-environmental conflicts (CUSEC) is introduced. Afterwards, the 
usefulness of this framework is illustrated by a discussion of two case studies, namely the Israeli-
Palestinian water conflict and forest conflicts between highland and lowland dwellers in northern 
Thailand. Finally, a conclusion is drawn. 
 
A CONSTRUCTIVIST UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONFLICTS 
Discourse is a concept which is widely used in the social sciences26 and already has been 
successfully employed in the study of socio-environmental conflicts.27 It will therefore serve as a 
starting point for the theoretical framework developed here.28 A discourse can be defined as ‘a 
specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and 
transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and 
social realities’.29 In other words, discourses constitute collectively shared meaning and thus 
define what is considered as true by a specific group. There is a vast literature showing how 
certain discourses (re-)produce specific understandings of a certain situational configurations, for 
instance as an environmental problem or a security threat.30 But besides such situation 
assessments, and empirically often deeply intertwined with them, discourses also provide ‘subject 
positions’31 for social actors. These define the role and characteristics, or in other words, the 
identity of individuals and social groups. 
The definition of discourse used here implies that discourses are (re-)produced by human 
practices and cannot exist independently of them.32 Thus, I assume a relationship of mutual 
structuration between discourses and practices in the sense that discourses structure the form and 
content of practices while practices in turn (re-)produce or transform discourses.33 This implies 
that discourses structure - or shape, facilitate and restrict - but never determine human actions. 
Practices can be understood as ‘conventionalized action patterns’ which follow a certain 
(discursively constructed) understanding about the proper way of acting in a certain situation.34 
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Practices refer to a wide range of actions, including making (oral or written) statements, on which 
most discourse analysts focus, but also dressing or controlling a border point. A discourse is 
considered dominant if it structures how a social group thinks about and acts towards the 
world.35 
Such an understanding of discourse can neatly be connected to conflict theory. An intergroup 
conflict can be defined as a process in which at least two collective actors conceive their 
respective interests as contradictory and undertake actions in order to enforce or articulate these 
interests.36 If such actions to enforce or articulate interests involve the use of direct, physical 
violence, a conflict can be considered violent.37 But interests do not just appear in the minds of 
individual or collective actors. Rather, interests arise from and are strongly shaped by a group’s 
collective identity: 
‘Questions regarding identities must always take precedence over questions regarding 
interests. It is only as some-one that we can have an interest in some-thing; it is only once we know 
who we are that we can know what we want.’38 
A collective identity can be defined as a social category which contains ‘constitutive norms’ that 
define who the members of a group are and by which attributes they are characterized and ‘social 
purposes’, i.e. the goals of the group.39 Furthermore, identities (or subject positions) are always 
relational and contain one or several Others against which a group defines itself.40 The boundary 
markers which determine whether an actor belongs to the Self or is considered as an Other are 
called ‘diacritica’41. Examples of diacritica that are identified as driving intergroup conflict include 
‘primordial resident – invader’42, ‘fair-minded – unjust’43 or ‘superior – inferior’44. Identities are 
also considered as likely to drive conflicts if the Other is perceived to be homogenous, if 
identities are seen as fixed and unchangeable and if the Other is constructed as a threat to the 
Self.45  
It has been discussed above that discourses not only (re-)produce subject positions/identities, but 
also situation assessments. The latter can be defined as the sum of an actor’s causality 
assumptions and perceptions of surrounding material conditions. Such assumptions/perceptions 
are relevant for the dynamics of all intergroup conflicts.46 But they are likely to be especially 
important for socio-environmental conflicts which are basically about the (perception and 
interpretation of) bio-physical and ecological materialities. With regard to the role of identities, 
interests and actions discussed above, situation assessments are relevant for three reasons: 
a) Situation assessments and identities mutually influence each other. The attributes and 
capabilities ascribed to the Self (identity), for instance, influence how a social group 
perceives the threat emanating from an environmental change or the growing influence of 
another group (situation assessment).47 In turn, the assessment of the speed of economic 
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growth in recent years or the military capabilities of neighbouring groups shape a group’s 
identity as hard-working or inherently threatened.48 
b) Situation assessments influence interests since the existence of an interest requires the 
prior definition of a situation against which this interest is articulated. For instance, a 
group’s interest in (concrete forms of) climate change mitigation and adaptation is 
influenced by the perceived consequences of climatic changes for the respective group.49 
c) Situation assessments are a key intervening variable between interests and actions since 
they define possibility spaces. For instance, a group might conclude that it is in its interest 
to attack a rival or prevent costal erosion. However, the group is unlikely to act in 
accordance with its interests if it assesses its technical, financial and military resources as 
insufficient to do so.50 
In the literature, many situation assessments are discussed as playing a crucial role for conflict 
onset and escalation. Examples include the description of an Other as responsible for a problem 
the Self faces51, the perception of important resources as being limited and/or the object of a 
zero-sum game52, the description of a valued reference object as existentially threatened53 or the 
assessment of unilateral actions and eventual violence as promising in terms of resources, 
salvation or security.54 
Such a constructivist understanding of intergroup conflicts seizes a middle ground between 
linguistic idealism/radical constructivism and materialism/objectivism. On the one hand, it insists 
that ‘everything we perceive, experience, sense is mediated through socially constructed and 
typified knowledge […] We have no direct access to the world per se’55 (epistemological 
constructivism). But on the other hand, it is emphasized that ‘the analysis of discursive 
constructions […] is especially powerful when done in the context of a study of the socio-
historical’ and bio-physical contexts (ontological realism).56 This pragmatism is in line with what 
Fierke calls conventional or weak constructivism in International Relations theory57 and resonates 
well with political ecology’s emphasis on ‘the simultaneity of symbolic and material struggles’ 
over natural resources.58 It allows researchers to take into consideration the characteristics of bio-
physical and socio-economic systems, but highlights that discourses structure how the relevant 
actors perceive and act towards these systems. 
Since discourses support particular constructions of situations and identities, they favor some 
options for action over alternative ones, that is, they constitute an important source or form of 
power.59 Such ideational or bargaining power exists in parallel to and is deeply intertwined with 
structural power, which derives from military and economic capacities.60 The ontological 
pragmatism of CUSEC allows for taking both structural/material and ideational forms of power 
into account. 
 7 
In sum, CUSEC emphasizes that the actions which constitute socio-environmental conflicts are 
structured by identities and situation assessments, which are in turn shaped by discourses. 
Discourses, by contrast, are (re-)produced by human actions and also shaped by the ‘material 
quality [of reality] which confronts us with problems of interpretation’.61 Figures 1 gives a 
summary of this theoretical framework: 
 
- INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE - 
Figure 1: Simplified summary of CUSEC 
 
EVIDENCE FROM CASES 
In this section, CUSEC will be applied to two socio-environmental conflicts about renewable 
resources perceived as scarce by the parties involved: the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict and 
forest conflicts in the north of Thailand. The cases were chosen for two reasons. Firstly, material 
factors, such as a dry climate and water scarcity in the Middle East62 or population growth and 
deforestation in South Asia63, are frequently portrayed as (potentially) important for the dynamics 
of these conflicts. This makes them hard cases for CUSEC, which highlights the importance of 
inter-subjective factors vis-à-vis objective environmental and demographic ‘facts’. Secondly, both 
cases differ considerably with regard to their political, geographical and cultural background, their 
embeddedness in larger conflicts, the nature of the parties involved, the public attention they 
receive and the resources they concern. For instance, in the Israeli-Palestinian case, military 
occupation coincidences with severe inequalities in vertical power64, while in Thailand, the 
conflict took place within internationally accepted state borders and all contending parties had 
some (although unequal) access to the same formal institutions.65 A short analysis of these two 
cases does certainly not prove CUSEC, but hopefully suggests its plausibility across different 
contexts. 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian Water Conflict 
The water conflict between Israel and Palestine is just one of several interrelated dimensions of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Water is one of the few topics on which no final (but only a 
provisional and contested) agreement could be reached during the peace process in the 1990s.66 
The existence of a water conflict is also expressed by current patterns of water distribution. 
According to the Oslo II interim agreement, signed in 1995 by the Israeli government and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Israel can withdraw 912 million cubic meters (MCM) 
per year from the shared mountain and coastal aquifers67, while Palestinians are only allowed to 
use 253 MCM/year.68 Furthermore, Israel extracts 600-700 MCM per year from the Jordan, while 
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Palestinians have no access to the river at all.69 Fresh water availability per capita is considerably 
higher in Israel than in Palestine, with many Palestinians living below the WHO recommendation 
of 100 liters of water per day.70  
This unequal utilization of the region’s water resources is consolidated and even increased by the 
Israeli-Palestinian water governance regime. Under the institutional framework established by the 
Oslo II accord, the Israeli administration can effectively block the development of water 
infrastructure or the rising of well extraction quotas in the West Bank, while Palestinians have no 
way to influence water-related projects or the utilization of shared water resources on Israel’s 
territory.71 Palestinians have little chances to change this situation since the West Bank is still 
occupied by Israel, while the Gaza Strip is largely sealed off. Especially in the West Bank, Israel is 
able to enforce the unequal water regime by destroying unauthorized water pipes, wells and 
pumps.72 The large majority of Palestinians is clearly not satisfied with the current situation and 
strives for an adjustment of water extraction quotas and the bilateral water policy framework.73 
The Israeli administration, in contrast, prefers to preserve the status quo.74  
From a positivist-rationalist point of view, the existence of such a conflict is surprising given that 
water as a physical quantity is neither extraordinarily scarce nor economically important in both 
countries.75 There will be enough water to satisfy domestic and basic agricultural water needs in 
the next decades even under extreme climate change and population growth scenarios.76 
Technological innovations are likely to relax the situation even more. Currently, around 50 per 
cent of Israel’s agricultural water demand is covered by recycled wastewater, while desalination 
provides approximately 25 per cent of the total water consumed in Israel.77 In addition, a large 
amount of virtual water is imported to the region in the form of food.78 Finally, agriculture, the 
by far most water-intensive economic sector, employs only 1.5 per cent of the Israeli and 7.0 per 
cent of the Palestinian population79 and accounts for no more than 2.5 per cent and 5.3 per cent 
of the respective GDP.80 
One might reply that many representatives of mainstream socio-environmental conflict research 
highlight the relevance of ‘resource capture’81 or ‘the misdistribution of renewable resources’82, 
and that the discourses only reflect these water-related inequalities. However, I would consider 
the unequal distribution of water resources as an expression of rather than as a reason for the 
water conflict. One could also interpret the water conflict as a mere byproduct of the wider 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But there are many examples of agreement on water issues in the 
context of intense conflicts.83 
Fortunately, there are a number of studies which have focused on water discourses in Israel and 
Palestine, which can be used to illustrate the additional insights gained from CUSEC. In the 
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following, I will focus on the dominant discourses in both societies84 and the identities and 
situation assessments they provide. 
Regarding the assessment of the water situation, Selby distinguishes three types of discourses.85 An 
‘ecological discourse’ states that regional water resources are limited, while population and 
demand are growing. According to a ‘technical discourse’, water problems are caused by 
inefficient infrastructures and administrations. Finally, a ‘political discourse’ insists that water 
scarcity is a product of unequal water distribution and thus ultimately of unequal power relations. 
This political discourse can also be considered as an injustice frame, which frames a group of 
people as being the victims of an unjust authority.86 
The Israeli assessment of the water situation combines elements of an ecological and a technical 
discourse. On the one hand, it insists that water in the Jordan basin is not sufficient to keep (let 
alone rise) current living standards in the region in the face of population growth, aquifer 
degradation and climate change (although this discourse of regional water scarcity only in the 
1950s replaced a discourse of regional water abundance).87 In the face of these challenges, it 
would be unwise to relinquish control over the aquifers and the Jordan River.88 The availability of 
additional water resources due to desalination and wastewater recycling has not yet caused a 
major desecuritization of water in the Israeli discourse or a greater willingness to share the 
aquifers and the Jordan River with the Palestinians.89 The lack of good-quality water available for 
the Palestinians, on the other hand, is depicted as a result of inefficient water management and 
the heavy pollution of water by the Palestinians. By contrast, water management in Israel is 
portrayed to be excellent.90 
The dominant water situation assessment in Palestine, by contrast, can be classified as a political 
discourse or injustice frame. Water resources in the region are described as sufficient to at least 
significantly increase the quantity and quality of water available for the Palestinians.91 
Consequentially, the unequal distribution of limited regional water resources in combination with 
the occupation of the West Bank, the Israeli blocking of Palestinian water infrastructure projects, 
and the isolation of the Gaza Strip are perceived as the root cause of water problems in 
Palestine.92 The assessments of the water situation in the Israeli and Palestinian discourses are 
drivers of the water conflict. Both discourses acknowledge the limits of water availability in the 
region. More importantly, however, the causes of the water problems are disputed between the 
dominant discourses of both sides, with each side (partially) portraying the Other as responsible 
for the water scarcity and/or pollution problems the Self faces.  
Although water is hardly a top priority in public and policy discussions nowadays,93 it is still 
closely connected to Israeli and Palestinian identities in the respective national discourses. Within 
the traditional Zionist ideology, water is closely related to agriculture, which is in turn crucial for 
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key Zionist goals such as settling the Holy Land and creating a safe Jewish homeland.94 The 
related identity offer is the ‘chalutz, the pioneer, who helps to build a Jewish state and thus 
contributes to the redemption of the ‘chosen people’.’95 Water disputes with its neighbours 
further contributed to the securitization of water in Israel.96 Confrontative diacritica can also be 
detected in the Israeli water discourse: While Israelis are depicted as reasonable, developed and 
good water managers, Palestinians are described as irrational, underdeveloped and water 
polluters.97 
In the dominant Palestinian discourse, water is connected to identity in two ways. Firstly, water is 
conceived as an attribute of the land which rightfully belongs to the Palestinians, but is currently 
occupied by Israel. The idea of control over sufficient water resources is therefore intrinsically 
tied to control over land and thus closely connected to the goals of Palestinian self-determination 
and a viable Palestinian state.98 Secondly, the ‘myth of the fellah, who works and sustains his land 
even in the worst of circumstances (and needs water to do that)’ continues to play a role for 
Palestinian identity construction.99 Related to the situation assessment described above, Israelis 
are referred to as ruthless and unfair in appropriating shared water resources.100 Palestinians, by 
contrast, are portrayed as not over-using common water resources and as being ready to share 
them equitable.101 
In sum, both dominant discourses construct water as important for the national identity and 
portray the respective Other as largely homogenous and negative. Given these identity 
constructions as well as the situation assessment provided by the dominant discourses, anything 
else than a conflict regarding the distribution and management of the (not particularly scarce) 
regional water resources is hardly imaginable. Israel, as the by far superior power in terms of 
structural and bargaining power, has so far been able to enforce most of its interests in this water 
conflict.102 
 
Forest Conflicts in Northern Thailand 
After the Second World War, Thailand experienced rapid and large-scale deforestation, with most 
of the timber cut was sold on international markets. A partial exception of this trend was the 
northern part of the country, and especially the northern highlands.103 The degradation of forests 
has been considerably slowed down by the imposition of a total logging ban in 1989, in 
combination with several national parks and protected areas established during the 1970s and 
1980s. However, these parks were frequently demarcated without sufficient local knowledge and 
often included the land of existing villages, especially when inhabited by ethnic minorities.104  
Starting in the early 1980s, northern Thailand experienced a socio-environmental conflict about 
forest resources, closely intertwined with disputes about water and land, which peaked in 
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intensity around the turn of the millennium.105 On the one hand, a coalition of ethnic Thai 
lowland dwellers demanded the eviction of ethnic minorities from the sensitive highland forests. 
In their point of view, the agricultural practices of the highland dwellers posed a threat to the 
agricultural livelihoods of the lowlanders.106 The lowland dwellers were supported by Thailand’s 
Royal Forest Department (RFD), conservationist groups lead by the Dhammanaat Foundation, 
national park authorities and parts of the military.107 On the other hand, highland-based ethnic 
minorities, such as the Hmong or the Karen, resisted their removal. Around 75 per cent of them 
did not have Thai citizenship, and even less had formal land titles, but most of them lived on 
their land for generations.108 Resistance against the relocation of these groups was supported by 
the Northern Famers’ Network, the Peasants’ Federation of Thailand and by the Land 
Department.109 
The conflict remained largely non-violent in terms of direct, physical violence. Both sides 
primarily resorted to public protests and lobbying.110 However, several instances of attacks 
against human beings and properties are reported. Most of them were directed against highland 
ethnic minorities and included the arrestment and forced eviction of people as well as the 
destruction of houses, crops, fruit trees and religious images.111 Some acts of counter-violence by 
highland groups occurred as well.112 
As in the Israeli-Palestinian case, CUSEC can shed much light on the causes and dynamics of this 
conflict. In terms of situation assessments, lowland agricultural groups blamed highland dwellers 
responsible for the severe environmental degradation they experienced. Traditionally, many 
highland groups practiced swidden agriculture, but since the late 1970s, sedentarization and the 
production of cash crops became much more widespread. While the latter is associated with 
higher inputs of water, fertilizers and pesticides,113 the former has been identified as a main 
source of deforestation. Both agricultural practices were portrayed by the dominant lowlander’s 
discourse as increasing water pollution and river silting, water scarcity in the dry season and 
destructive floods during the rain season in the valleys.114 Influenced by international fortress 
conservation discourses115, the RFD and the Dhammanaat Foundation perceived the agricultural 
practices of the highland groups as particularly damaging for the watershed forests, which were 
discursive constructed as located in the highlands and of great hydrological importance.116 
According to York, ‘in the minds of the lowlanders, watershed forest is the only “important” 
section of the forest, and the “source” of the river on which their livelihoods depend’.117 
This situation assessment was clearly resisted in the dominant discourse of the highland groups. 
Here, the widespread deforestation in the lowlands due to commercial logging and inadequate 
management was identified as the main reason for the disturbance of the watershed regime. The 
water scarcity lowland framers faced was perceived as a consequence of their increasing 
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cultivation of water-intensive cash crops and of double cropping.118 According to the highland 
groups’ dominant discourse, the concentration of many remaining forests on higher elevations 
clearly indicates their ability to preserve and manage forests, which can be contrasted with 
widespread deforestation in the valleys.119 Highland groups also insisted that they know the 
location and importance of watershed forests and protect them accordingly. Their dominant 
discourse identified the expansion of (badly managed) national parks and of lowlander’s cash 
crop fields into the highlands as the most important threat to these watershed forests.120 
In sum, the discourses of both groups promoted very different understandings of the ecological 
situation. Due to their primarily agricultural livelihoods, both groups also perceived the ongoing 
degradation of forest and water resources as an existential threat to their well-being and identified 
the respective Other as responsible for this degradation. Discursively constructed situation 
assessment can thus be considered as a central driver of this socio-environmental conflict. 
These situation assessments were related to multiple diacritica and identity constructions. In the 
lowlanders’ discourse, the highland groups were not only portrayed as backwards swidden 
agriculturalists or greedy commercial farmers which tacitly accept the destruction of valuable 
forests. These highland groups, which are usually ethnic minorities, were also portrayed as 
uncivilized, stateless foreigners and non-Thai.121 Following the dominant Thai cosmology, they 
were considered to live far away from the ‘guardian spirit’ of the city (Muang) in the valley and 
close to the ‘devil spirits of the forest (Pa)’.122 Along the lines of this ‘racialization’123, the RFD 
and parts of the military considered the highland ethnic minorities as disloyal to the Thai state, 
which was expressed by their assumed support of the Communist insurgency in the 1970s, and as 
illegal opium growers.124 
Not surprisingly, another discourse was dominant among the highland groups. Firstly, they 
insisted that some of them were already Thai citizens, while nearly all others considered 
themselves to be part of the Thai nation and strove for citizenship.125 Secondly, in their dominant 
discourse, the highland groups were portrayed as experienced and capable stewards of the 
mountain environment, while lowlanders and especially the RFD were portrayed as bad forest 
managers.126 Consequentially, a paradigm shift from state-led/fortress conservation to 
community-based forest management was demanded.127 Thirdly, several recent activities of the 
lowland farmers and the Thai state were perceived as an existential threat to the highland groups. 
These included the demarcation of national parks without consulting local inhabitants, the 
limitation of swidden agriculture by erecting fences and declaring fallow lands as protected forest, 
and demands to evict these groups from the highlands.128 In the highlander’s discourse, these 
measures were not only constructed as an economic or livelihood threat, but also as an identity 
threat, since the identities of the highland groups are strongly place-based.129 
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These discursively constructed identities and situation assessment were crucial for the 
development of the conflict between the lowland farmers, the highland ethnic minorities and 
their respective allies. If, for instance, lowland groups had identified the commercial logging of 
forests in the valleys as the main source of water scarcity and river sedimentation, and if their 
identity constructions had not been based on the highlanders as the non-Thai Other, the onset of 
such an intensive socio-environmental conflict would have been impossible. Of course, material 
factors and forms of hard power also played a role in shaping the conflict dynamics, such as 
international pressure to fight opium cultivation and deforestation, state support for commercial 
agriculture, competition about agricultural land in the lower highlands, population growth, the 
1997 financial crisis and several droughts during the 1990s played an important role as well.130 
However, explanations based purely on these factors would miss important aspects of the 
conflict. 
In a similar matter, the de-escalation (although not termination) of the conflict since the early 
2000s, with the result that most upland dwellers were not evicted, can only be explained by 
considering forms of structural and bargaining (discursive) power simultaniously. Space 
constraints preclude an extensive discussion of this issue, but the relevant factors include: a better 
organization of marginalized farmers in the mid-1990s, the coming into power of governments 




At the beginning of this paper, a positivist-rationalist bias was identified in the mainstream 
research on socio-environmental conflicts. In other words, many studies conceptualize 
individuals and social groups as utility maximizers which act in an instrumental rationalist manner 
towards a bio-physical and socio-economic surrounding which is reduced to its material, 
seemingly objective characteristics. Such assumptions are contradicted by a large body of 
literature from constructivist conflict research, environmental sociology and political ecology. 
Hence, mainstream research on socio-environmental conflicts tends to miss an important part of 
the picture, namely the inter-subjective and socially constructed dimensions of such conflicts. In 
order to account for these, I developed a constructivist understanding of socio-environmental 
conflicts (CUSEC), which highlights the importance of discursively constructed situation 
assessments, identities and interests. A discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict and 
forest conflicts in northern Thailand illustrated the relevance of CUSEC and suggested its 
plausibility across different contexts 
 14 
Constructivist accounts have not yet gained much ground in the mainstream research on socio-
environmental conflicts. Not surprisingly, then, several important tasks need to be performed by 
future research on the issue, four of which I shortly discuss here.  
Firstly, to show its merits but also its limits, CUSEC should be applied to other cases of socio-
environmental conflicts and too longer time periods. It is very relevant to trace how identities 
and situation assessments change over time and how this influences the dynamics of socio-
environmental conflicts. Similarly, the framework developed above is designed to be applicable to 
different contexts. A comparison of several cases drawing on CUSEC would permit researchers 
to figure out which identities and environmental assessments facilitate socio-environmental 
conflict or violence under which circumstances. Pastoralist conflicts in the Horn of Africa are 
interesting cases in this regard.132 Researchers have highlighted the relevance of perceptions of 
rainfall changes, negative diacritica, or assessments of commercial opportunities, but a systematic 
discussion of these issues is still pending.133  
Secondly, neither the theoretical framework nor the case studies presented above deny the 
relevance of a material quality of the world, although it cannot be objectively perceived. Political 
ecologists and historical materialists have done considerable work on the role of structural power 
asymmetries, marginalization and resource appropriation in socio-environmental conflicts.134 A 
more thorough integration of these insights with CUSEC promises great analytical potential.  
Thirdly, as partially shown for conservation discourses northern Thailand, it is important to 
investigate how global/international discourses interact with local discourses in order to create 
more or less conflictive identities and situation assessments.135 Finally, it is promising to analyse 
how macro-discourses like those discussed above are used in concrete framing processes by 
various actors. This would reveal why and when certain actors resort to which conflict actions 
and thus increase our understanding the micro-dynamics of socio-environmental conflicts.136 
On a practical level, CUSEC implies that conflicts around scarce natural resources are not solely 
driven by greedy or impoverished actors which strive to increase their control over these 
resources, but that confrontative situation assessments and identity constructions are extremely 
important in understanding the onset, dynamic and cessation of such conflicts. However, 
discourses are not static and can, even in conflict environments, change over time. 
Consequentially, efforts towards prevention, mediation and solution of socio-environmental 
conflicts should not just aim at improving agricultural practices or providing more water, but 
utilize tools which aim at transforming the discourses of the parties involved to be more 
compatible and cooperation-prone.137 
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